

But how about the campaign projected for the French and Italian war areas? Were the Ghanilly plans still in force there? By these *French and* schemes another Somme offensive on a *Italian plans* [^]d front was contemplated in France unpromising

in Italy there was to be the same old attack on Istria or the Trentino—on both fronts we were doomed to a repetition of the identical denting and chipping tactics to which we were accustomed, with each Ally acting independently on its own front. The only pretence at co-operation was to be found in an effort to time a simultaneous start of the useless slaughter of brave men on each front, each Allied country making its contribution to the holocaust. The campaigns of 1917 were to be another exhibition of platitudes in action, planned by minds too unimaginative or too tired to think of any variation or flourish.

It was late in the day to effect a complete change in the plan of campaign for 1917. That ought to have been done at the Paris Conference in November.

If a charge of breach of faith was to be avoided (and such a charge, if believed, is fatal to an alliance), nothing could be done without *Allies* obtaining the assent of the leaders

of the four Great Allied Armies. This was a hopeless prospect, for the Ghanilly plans were their own and they naturally thought them the best. No change could be made

without
further consultation. How was effective
consultation
possible at this late hour ? Any
fundamental alteration
of plans involved an admission of
error on the
part of these great warriors. Pressure
from statesmen
might force a thorough reconsideration.
But was that
pressure likely ? Not from what I knew of
the leading